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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2994 
 ___________ 
 
 JIN CHEN, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
      Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A098-046-764) 
 Immigration Judge:  Miriam K. Mills 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 
 Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: January 5, 2012 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM  
 Jin Chen petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying asylum, withholding 
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  For the reasons 
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detailed below, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Chen is a citizen of China.  He arrived in the United States in 2004, and was 
charged by the Department of Homeland Security with being removable under section 
212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien who was present in the United States without being 
admitted.   
 Chen conceded that he was removable as charged, but applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and CAT protection.  Chen contended that he was entitled to 
relief because he had experienced past persecution, and feared future persecution, due to 
his practice of Falun Gong.  At a hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ), Chen testified 
that he began practicing in 2002.  In 2004, police raided the house where he and his 
companions practiced; although Chen was not then present, the police located and 
arrested him, detained him for three weeks, and beat him daily during the detention.  
Chen stated that his parents eventually paid a fee that secured his release, but after he was 
freed, the police sought to re-arrest him.  Chen therefore fled to the United States.   
 The IJ denied all relief to Chen.  The IJ determined that Chen had not testified 
credibly in support of his claims, and had also failed to present necessary corroborating 
evidence.  The IJ concluded that these flaws doomed each of Chen’s claims.  The BIA 
then remanded the case to the IJ, concluding that part of her credibility finding — that 
Chen was not credible because he had not displayed a knowledge of Falun Gong — was 
improper because no one at the hearing had asked Chen any questions that would probe 
his knowledge of the practice.   
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 On remand, the IJ again denied Chen’s claims.  The IJ explained that even 
assuming that Chen was knowledgeable about Falun Gong, he had failed to present 
credible testimony or sufficient corroborating evidence, and that he was therefore not 
entitled to relief.  This time, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s analysis and dismissed Chen’s 
appeal.  Chen then filed a timely petition for review in this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review the BIA’s final order 
of removal.  Where, as here, the BIA renders its own decision and does not merely adopt 
the opinion of the IJ, we review the BIA’s decision.  Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 
230 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 Chen first argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he had failed to provide 
credible testimony.  We review agency factual determinations, including findings 
concerning credibility, under the substantial evidence standard, treating them as 
“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  Because Chen filed his asylum application after 
May 11, 2005, the provisions of the REAL ID Act governing credibility determinations 
apply.  See Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).  Prior to the 
implementation of the REAL ID Act, minor omissions or inconsistencies that did not go 
to the heart of an asylum applicant’s claim were insufficient to support adverse credibility 
determinations.  See Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under the 
REAL ID Act, meanwhile, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on any 
inconsistencies, without regard to whether they relate to the heart of the alien’s claim.  
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§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
1
 
 We conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s credibility finding.  As 
an initial matter, in his asylum application, Chen stated only that while he was detained, 
“the officers interrogated me and beat me up.”  Meanwhile, Chen testified at his hearing 
to much more drastic mistreatment:  he said that he was beaten daily, often with hammers 
and sticks.  While “[a]n applicant’s testimony is not per se lacking in credibility simply 
because it includes details that are not set forth in the asylum application,” Cao v. Att’y 
Gen., 407 F.3d 146, 160 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), it was 
reasonable for the BIA to believe that Chen would not have left such compelling, graphic 
details out of his original application if the incidents had truly occurred, see Reynoso-
Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2004) (later embellishment of claim may 
support adverse credibility finding) — especially since an attorney had helped him 
prepare his application, cf. Smolniakova v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 
2005).   
 Likewise, Chen’s testimony about being beaten with hammers and sticks conflicts 
with an affidavit provided by his friend, Yin Hua Zhou, who was arrested along with 
Chen, in which Zhou stated only that during detention, the men were treated “rudely.”  
See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that credibility determinations 
may be based on, among other things, “the consistency of such statements with other 
evidence of record”).  Finally, it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that Chen’s 
                                                 
1
 We have not yet applied the REAL ID Act standard in a precedential opinion.  Here, the 
inconsistencies that the agency found relate to the heart of Chen’s claims for relief, and would 
thus support an adverse credibility determination even under the pre-REAL ID Act standard.   
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credibility was undermined by the fact that, in his affidavit, he mentioned practicing 
Falun Gong with his companions only on Sundays, while he testified that he practiced 
with his friends almost every day.  For these reasons, we discern no error in the BIA’s 
credibility finding.
2
 
 Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Chen’s future-
persecution claim is further undermined by his failure to corroborate his contention that 
he practices Falun Gong in the United States.  Corroboration may reasonably be expected 
for “facts which are central to his or her claim and easily subject to verification.”  
Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We have consistently held that “failure to produce corroborating evidence may 
undermine an applicant’s case where (1) the IJ identifies facts for which it is reasonable 
to expect the applicant to produce corroboration, (2) the applicant fails to corroborate, 
and (3) the applicant fails to adequately explain that failure.”  Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 
F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2007).  Under the INA, “[n]o court shall reverse a 
determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of corroborating 
evidence . . . unless the court finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to 
conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). 
 Here, the BIA engaged in the appropriate inquiry.  The BIA noted that, while 
Chen claimed that he practiced Falun Gong in the United States, he had presented no 
                                                 
2
 Because Chen’s asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims are based on the same 
testimony, the adverse credibility finding is fatal to all three claims.  See Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 
F.3d 346, 349 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Zine v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 535, 541 (8th Cir. 2008).     
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evidence to corroborate this fact.  As the BIA emphasized, Chen testified that his cousin, 
his cousin’s wife, his cousin’s daughter, and his roommate have all seen him practice in 
the United States; they thus could readily have corroborated his avowed practice.  
Moreover, the IJ expressly interrogated Chen about his failure to obtain corroborating 
evidence.  It was altogether reasonable for the BIA to find that Chen’s explanation — that 
people were busy and that he was embarrassed to ask for help — was unpersuasive.  
Accordingly, the record does not compel a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s.  See 
generally Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 Finally, Chen argues that he was denied due process during his hearing before the 
IJ.  More specifically, he contends that on remand, the IJ failed to act as a neutral 
factfinder.  We exercise plenary review over this claim; to prevail, Chen must show 
“substantial prejudice.”  Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
 Chen’s right to due process was not violated here.  The BIA remanded the case 
because it concluded that the IJ had improperly based her credibility finding in part on a 
determination that Chen lacked knowledge of Falun Gong.  On remand, the IJ held a 
hearing in which she invited Chen to display his understanding of the practice and 
permitted him to present other evidence.  While the IJ appeared slightly frustrated by 
Chen’s failure to address the other aspects of her previous credibility finding — that is, 
the various inconsistencies discussed above — this does not amount to a due process 
violation.  See generally Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
